We study the impact of research collaborations in coauthorship networks on research output and how optimal funding can maximize it. Through the links in the collaboration network, researchers create spillovers not only to their direct coauthors but also to researchers indirectly linked to them. We characterize the equilibrium when agents collaborate in multiple and possibly overlapping projects. We bring our model to the data by analyzing the coauthorship network of economists registered in the RePEc Author Service. We rank the authors and research institutions according to their contribution to the aggregate research output and thus provide a novel ranking measure that explicitly takes into account the spillover efect generated in the coauthorship network. Moreover, we analyze funding instruments for individual researchers as well as research institutions and compare them with the economics funding program of the National Science Foundation. Our results indicate that, because current funding schemes do not take into account the availability of coauthorship network data, they are ill-designed to take advantage of the spillover efects generated in scientiic knowledge production networks.
Introduction
Collaborations between researchers in economics have become signiicantly more important in recent decades. In 1996 multi-authored papers accounted for 50% of all articles published in economics. This number increased to over 75% in 2014 [Kuld and O'Hagan, 2018] . 1 Through such collaborations researchers generate spillovers not only to their direct collaboration partners but also indirectly to other researchers who are connected to them within a complex network of collaborations. However, despite the increasing importance of collaborations in the scientiic knowledge production process, existing research policies and funding agencies do not take spillovers in the coauthorhsip network into account. The aim of this paper is to develop and structurally estimate a coauthorship network model that allows us to rank researchers and evaluate research funding schemes that take spillovers in the coauthorship network into account.
We build a micro-founded model for scientiic knowledge production that generalizes previous ones in the literature by taking complementarities in research eforts between collaborating researchers into account [cf. Ballester et al., 2006; Cabrales et al., 2011; Jackson and Wolinsky, 1996] . We completely characterize the equilibrium outcome when researchers spend efort in multiple and possibly overlapping projects. The equilibrium solution to this model then allows us to rank the impacts of individual researchers on total research output, and design optimal network-based research funding programs.
Based on our economic micro-foundation, we develop an econometric model in which the unobserved efort levels are determined by the Nash equilibrium. The self-selection of researchers into diferent projects is determined by a matching process that depends on both the researchers' and projects' characteristics [cf. e.g., Chandrasekhar and Jackson, 2012; Friel et al., 2016] . We estimate this model using data for the network of scientiic coauthorships between economists registered in the Research Papers in Economics (RePEc) Author Service. 2 We then propose a novel ranking measure for economists and their departments, which is derived from our economic micro-foundation that explicitly models spillovers between collaborating economists. Our ranking quantiies the endogenous decline in the total research output due to the removal of an economist from the coauthorship network [cf. Ballester et al., 2006; König et al., 2014] and allows us to determine key players [cf. Zenou, 2015] , or superstar economists [cf. Azoulay et al., 2010; Waldinger, 2010 Waldinger, , 2012 . 3 Taking into account endogenous efort choices of the authors and their interdependencies across the coauthorship network, we 1 Additional evidence can be found in Ductor [2014] . 2 When two authors claim the same paper in the RePEc digital library, they are coauthors, and the relationship of coauthorship creates an undirected network between them. RePEc assembles the information about publications relevant to economics from over 2000 publishers, including all major commercial publishers and university presses, policy institutions, and pre-prints from academic institutions. See http://repec.org/ for a general description of the RePEc project. 3 Note that the efect of hiring superstar scientists on the proitability of irms has been studied in Hess and Rothaermel [2011] , Rothaermel and Hess [2007] and Lacetera et al. [2004] . In particular, Rothaermel and Hess [2007] deine superstar scientists as researchers who had both published and been cited at a rate of three standard deviations above the mean. In contrast, our measure of superstar scientists takes into account the spillover efects of one scientist on others in a collaboration network. 1 ind that the highest ranked authors are not necessarily the ones with the largest number of citations or that our ranking coincides with other ones used in the literature. This discrepancy is not surprising, as traditional rankings are typically not derived from micro-economic foundations and typically do not take into account the spillover efects generated in scientiic knowledge production networks.
Our model further allows us to solve an optimal research funding problem of a planner who wants to maximize total scientiic output by introducing research grants into the author's payof function [Stephan, 1996 [Stephan, , 2012 . We study how the funds to diferent researchers impact aggregate scientiic output [cf. König et al., 2014] . We then aggregate researchers by their research institutions and departments, and compute the optimal funding for these institutions [cf. Aghion et al., 2010] . A comparison of our optimal funding policy with the research funding of the economics program of the National Science Foundation (NSF) indicates that there are signiicant diferences, both at the individual and the departmental levels. In particular, we ind that our optimal funding policy is signiicantly positively correlated with the number of coauthors (or degree in the coauthorship network) of an author. In contrast, the NSF awards are not correlated with the degree and they are positively but not signiicantly correlated with the optimal funding policy. This highlights the importance of the coauthorship network in determining the optimal funding policy, in contrast to the research funding program of the NSF.
There exists a growing literature, both empirical and theoretical, on the formation and consequences of coauthorship networks. On the empirical side, the structural features of scientiic collaboration networks have been analyzed in Goyal et al. [2006] , Newman [2001a Newman [ , 2001b and König [2016] . Fafchamps et al. [2010] study predictors for the establishment of scientiic collaborations. Ductor et al. [2014] and Ductor [2014] study how these collaborations afect research output of individual authors. At an aggregate level, Bosquet and Combes [2017] estimate the efect of department size on its research output. In contrast to these works we take a structural approach by introducing a production function for the scientiic coauthorship network and provide a clear explanation on how co-authorship networks facilitate scientiic knowledge production. Moreover, we develop a micro-founded ranking measure of authors and their departments [cf. Azoulay et al., 2010; Liu et al., 2011; Waldinger, 2010 Waldinger, , 2012 , 4 and investigate optimal research funding policies [cf. De Frajay, 2016; König et al., 2014; Stephan, 2012] .
Our paper is further related to the recent theoretical contributions by Baumann [2014] and Salonen [2016] , where agents choose time to invest into bilateral relationships. Our model extends the set-ups considered in these papers to allow for investments into multiple projects involving more than two agents. Moreover, in a related paper Bimpikis et al. [2014] analyze irms competing in quantities à la Cournot across diferent markets with a similar linear-quadratic payof speciication and allows irms to choose endogenously the quantities sold to each market.
In contrast to these authors, the eforts invested by the agents in diferent projects in our model are strategic complements as opposed to substitutes in their papers.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the scientiic knowledge production function and agents' utility function. The policy relevance of our model is illustrated in Section 3; in Section 3.1 we investigate the impact of the removal of an author from the network, while in Section 3.2 we analyze optimal research funding schemes that take into account the spillovers generated across collaborating authors in the network. The empirical implications of the model are discussed in Section 4. The data used for this study are described in Section 4.1, and our econometric methodology is explained in Section 4.2. The matching process of authors and projects is introduced in Section 4.3, a Bayesian estimation method is discussed in Section 4.4 and estimation results are given in Section 4.5. The empirical key player analysis (at both, author and department levels) is then provided in Section 5. Section 6 provides the optimal research funding policy and compares it with the economics funding program by the NSF. Section 7 concludes. The proofs are relegated to Appendix A. More detailed information about the data can be found in Appendix B and some relevant technical material can be found in Appendices C, D, and E. Additional robustness checks are provided in Appendix F.
Theoretical Model

Team Production Function
Let P = {1, . . . , p} denote a set of projects (research papers) and N = {1, . . . , n} denote a set of agents (authors or researchers). The production function for project s ∈ P is given by 5
where Y s is the research output of project s, g is ∈ {0, 1} indicates whether agent i participates in project s, e is is the research efort that agent i spends in project s (e is = 0 if agent i does not participate in project s), α i captures the ability of agent i, f ij ∈ (0, 1] measures knowledge similarity between agents i and j, the spillover-efect parameter λ > 0 represents complementarity between the research eforts of collaborating agents, and G stands for the bipartite network of authors and projects (cf., Figure 1 ).
Utility Function
We assume that the utility function of agent i is given by
where δ s ∈ (0, 1] is a discount factor, 6 and the parameter ϕ > 0 represents substitutability between the research eforts of the same agent in diferent projects. 7 This cost is convex if and only if the p × p matrix Φ, with diagonal elements equal to one and of-diagonal elements equal to ϕ, is positive deinite. The quadratic cost speciication includes the convex separable cost speciication as a special case when ϕ = 0. A theoretical model with a similar cost speciication but allowing for only two activities is studied in Belhaj and Deroïan [2014] and an empirical analysis is provided in Liu [2014] and Cohen-Cole et al. [2018] . Further, a convex separable cost speciication can be found in the model studied in Adams [2006] .
The following proposition provides a complete equilibrium characterization of the agents' efort portfolio e = [e ⊤ 1 , · · · , e ⊤ p ] ⊤ , with e s = [e 1s , · · · , e ns ] ⊤ for s = 1, · · · , p, in the projects they participate. Let
where ⊗ denotes the Kronecker product, G is an np-dimensional diagonal matrix given by
{g is }}, F is an n × n zero-diagonal matrix with the (i, j)-th (i ̸ = j) element being f ij , and J p is an p × p zero-diagonal matrix with of-diagonal elements equal to one. Let ρ max (A) denote the spectral radius of a square matrix A. Proposition 1. Suppose the production function for each project s ∈ P is given by Equation (1) and the utility function for each agent i ∈ N is given by Equation (2) . Given the bipartite
then the equilibrium efort portfolio is given by
where L λ,ϕ = λW − ϕM, δ = [δ 1 , · · · , δ p ] ⊤ and α = [α 1 , · · · , α n ] ⊤ . 6 If δs = 1, then individual payof from research output Ys is not discounted. If δs = 1/ ∑ i∈N gis, then the individual payof is discounted by the number of agents (coauthors) participating in project s [cf. Hollis, 2001; Jackson and Wolinsky, 1996; Kandel and Lazear, 1992] . 7 For example, Ductor [2014] inds evidence for a congestion externality proxied by the average number of co-authors' papers that has a negative efect on individual academic productivity. Observe that the matrix L λ,ϕ represents a weighted matrix of the line graph L(G) for the bipartite network G, 8 where each link between nodes sharing a project has weight λδ s f ij , and each link between nodes sharing an author has weight −ϕ. An example can be found in Figure 1 with f ij = 1 for all i ̸ = j and δ s = 1 for all s. We will illustrate the equilibrium characterization of Proposition 1 in the following example corresponding to the bipartite network in Figure 1 .
Example 1. Consider a network with 2 projects and 3 agents, where agents 1 and 2 are collaborating in the irst project and agents 1 and 3 are collaborating in the second project. An illustration can be found in Figure 1 . For expositional purposes, let f ij = 1 for all i ̸ = j and δ s = 1 for all s. Following Equation (3), 
The nonzero entries of the matrices W and M correspond to, respectively, the solid lines and the dashed lines in the line graph depicted in the bottom panel of Figure 1 . Thus, the (1, 2)-th and (2, 1)-th elements of the matrix L λ,ϕ represent the link between e 11 and e 21 with weight λ in the line graph, the (4, 6)-th and (6, 4) -th elements represent the link between e 12 and e 32 with weight λ, and the (1, 4)-th and (4, 1)-th elements represent the link between e 11 and e 12 with weight −ϕ.
In this example, the suicient condition for the existence of a unique equilibrium given by (4) holds if |λ| < 1 and |ϕ| < 1 − λ 2 . From Equation (5) the equilibrium efort portfolio is
which suggest that more-productive agents raise not only their own efort levels but also the efort levels of their collaborators. On the other hand,
which suggest that more-productive agents induce lower efort levels spent by agents on other projects. An illustration can be seen in the top panels in Figure 2 with α 2 = 0.5, α 3 = 0.8, The marginal change of the equilibrium efort e * 11 of agent 1 in project 1 with respect to the spillover parameter λ is given by
Observe that the coeicient of α 3 is negative. Thus, when α 3 is large enough, ∂e * 11 /∂λ could be negative. The reason is that, with increasing λ, the complementarity efects between collaborating agents become stronger, and this efect is more pronounced for the collaboration of agent 1 with the more-productive agent 3, than with the less-productive agent 2. Moreover, when the substitution efect parameter ϕ is large, agent 1 may spend even less efort in the project with agent 2, indicating congestion and substitution efects across projects.
Policy Implications
In the following we analyze the importance of authors and their departments in the coauthorship network (cf. Section 3.1), and we investigate how research funds should optimally be allocated to them (cf. Section 3.2).
Superstars, Key Players and Rankings
In this section we analyze the impact of a removal of an individual author from the coauthorship network on overall scientiic output [cf. e.g., Waldinger, 2010 Waldinger, , 2012 . The author whose removal would result in the greatest loss is termed the key author [Zenou, 2015] or superstar [Azoulay et al., 2010] . More formally, let G\A denote the network with agents in the set A removed from the bipartite network G. The key author is deined by 9
Further, aggregating researchers to their departments D ⊂ N allows us to compute the key department as
Research Funding
In this section we consider a simple, merit-based research funding policy that takes complementarities in collaborative research eforts into account. For this purpose we consider a two-stage game: in the irst stage, the planner announces the research funding scheme that the authors should receive, and in the second stage the authors choose their research eforts, given the research funding scheme. The optimal funding proile can then be found by backward induction. 10 Aggregating the individual funds to the department level also allows us to determine the optimal research funding for departments. For a general discussion of funding of academic research, see Stephan [1996 Stephan [ , 2012 .
We irst solve the second stage of the game. We assume that agent i ∈ N receives meritbased research funding, r is ∈ R + , per unit of the output she generates in project s ∈ P. Then the utility function (2) can be extended to
The Nash equilibrium efort levels for the utility function in Equation (8) are derived in the following proposition.
Suppose the production function for each project s ∈ P is given by Equation (1) and the utility function for each agent i ∈ N is given by Equation (8) . Given the bipartite network G, if
where
Note that compared with Proposition 1, the introduction of research funding R raises the spillover parameter λ and the abilities α by a factor that is proportional to (I np +R) in the Nash equilibrium efort levels in Equation (10). Thus, this policy essentially enhances the researchers'
abilities and the spillovers generated between collaborators.
Given the equilibrium efort portfolio, e * (R), in the irst stage of the game, the planner maxi-
, less the cost of the policy,
. The planner's problem can thus be written as
where Y s (G, R) is the output of project s from Equation (1) with the equilibrium efort levels e * (R) given by Equation (10). Equation (11) can then be solved numerically using a constrained nonlinear optimization algorithm [cf. e.g., Nocedal and Wright, 2006 ]. 11
Empirical Implications
Data
The data used for this study make extensive use of the metadata assembled by the RePEc initiative and its various projects. RePEc assembles information about publications relevant to economics from over 2000 publishers, including all major commercial publishers and university presses, policy institutions, and pre-prints (working papers) from academic institutions. At the time of our data collection, this encompasses 2.6 million records, including 0.82 million 11 Finding the optimal subsidy program R * is equivalent to solving a bilevel optimization problem [cf. Bard, 2013] , which can be implemented following a two-stage procedure: First, one computes the Nash equilibrium efort levels e * (R) that maximize the utilities of Equation (8) as a function of the funding R. Second, one can apply an optimization routine to Equation (11), for example using MATLAB's function fmincon. While this would work ine in applications with few agents, it would quickly become ineicient for larger-scale problems. This bilevel optimization problem can be formulated more eiciently as a mathematical programming problem with equilibrium constraints (MPEC; see also Luo et al. [1996] ), which treats the Nash equilibrium conditions as constraints. This method has recently been proposed to structural estimation problems following the seminal paper by Su and Judd [2012] , which further recommends to use the KNITRO version of MATLAB's fmincon function to improve speed and accuracy.
pre-prints. 12
In addition, we make use of the data made available by various projects that build on this RePEc data and enhance it in various ways. First, we take the publication proiles of economists registered with the RePEc Author Service (54,000 authors), which include what they have published and where they are ailiated. 13 Second, we extract information about their advisors, students, and alma mater, as recorded in the RePEc Genealogy project. 14 This academic genealogy data has been complemented with some of the data used in Colussi [2017] . 15 Third, we use the New Economics Papers (NEP) project to identify which ield speciic mailing lists through which the papers have been disseminated. 16 NEP has human editors who determine the ield in which new working papers belong. We obtain 99 distinct NEP ields. Fourth, we make use of paper download data that is made available by the LogEc project. 17 Fifth, we use citations to the papers and articles as extracted by the CitEc project. 18 Sixth, we use journal impact factors; and author and institution rankings from IDEAS. 19 Finally, we make use of the Ethnea tool at the University of Illinois to establish the ethnicity of authors based on the irst and last names. 20 Compared with other data sources, RePEc has the advantage of linking these various datasets in a seamless way that is veriied by the respective authors. Author identiication is superior to any other dataset as homonyms are disambiguated by the authors themselves as they register and maintain their accounts. While not every author is registered, most are.
Indeed, 90% of the top 1000 economists as measured by their publication records for the 1990-2000 period are registered. 21 We believe that the proportion is higher for the younger generation that is more familiar with social networks and online tools and thus more likely to register with online services. Note also that the 54,000 authors on RePEc amount to more than the combined membership of the American Economic Society, the Econometric Society, and the European Economic Association including overlaps (20,152+6,133+3,215=29,500) , not all of which may actually be authors.
In terms of publications, RePEc covers all important outlets and over 3,000 journals are listed, most of them with extensive coverage. References are extracted for about 30% of their articles (in addition to working papers) to compute citation counts and impact factors. The missing references principally come from publishers refusing to release them for reasons related to copyright protection. While the resulting gap is unfortunate, it is unlikely to result in a bias against particular authors, ields, or journals. The exception may be authors who are signiicantly cited in outlets outside of economics that may or may not be indexed in RePEc (note that several top management, statistics, and political science journals are also indexed).
The amount of RePEc data that is available for this study is overwhelming for the methods we need to adopt to estimate the model. So, we apply a series of ilters to reduce the sample size and to obtain records that are complete for our purposes:
1. We select papers that had a irst pre-print version within a given span of years. We choose 2010-2012 because it is old enough to give all authors the chance to have added the papers to their proiles and for the papers to have been eventually published in journals. But it is not too old to make sure we have a good-sized sample, as the coverage of RePEc becomes slimmer with older vintages. To examine robustness of our indings with respect to the selection of sample period, we also study the samples of 2007-2009 and 2013-2015 and report the results in Appendix F.
2. We require all authors of the papers to be registered with RePEc.
3. We require that the RePEc Genealogy includes where and under which advisors all authors studied.
4. We require that ethnicity could be determined for all authors.
In the end, we have a dataset for the years 2010 to 2012 with 8,447 papers written by 3,610 distinct authors for which we have complete data. The numbers are similar for the other years. 22 In our empirical model, we use the number of citations of the paper weighted by recursive discounted impact factors of the citing outlet as the measure of a paper's output. 23
Because computing the weighted recursive impact factor requires information about citations, we further drop 2,860 papers that do not have any citations up to July 2018 when retrieving from RePEc. Meanwhile, we also drop 680 authors who only work on these dropped papers without any citations. To understand an author's ability, we use explanatory variables including author's log lifetime citations (at the point of sample collection), decades after receiving Ph.D., dummy variables for being a male, having an NBER ailiation, and graduating from the Ivy
League. 24
The summary statistics of the variables that we use in our empirical model are provided in Table 1 . The paper output measure is heavily right-skewed, with the average equal to 6.77 but the maximum equal to 573.23. The average number of authors in each paper is 1.6. The data contain 81% male authors, 5% editors, 10% having an NBER ailiation, and 13.5% Ivy League graduates. The average experience of authors is 1.08 decades after receiving a Ph.D. and the average number of lifetime citations is 221.8. The average number of papers written by an author in the sample period is 3.07. Figure 5 shows the distributions of authors per paper and the number of papers per author, the latter being much more skewed and dispersed over a range of 1 to 74 papers. Moreover, Figure 3 shows the collaboration network among authors and Figure   4 shows the network of collaborations of departments/institutions from the RePEc database.
The network of departments is more concentrated among a few central institutions than the network of coauthors. This might stem from the fact that individual authors are constrained in the number of collaborations they can maintain, while these constraints are much less limiting at an aggregate departmental level.
22 Summary statistics and estimation results covering the years 2007-2009 and 2013-2015 can be found in Appendix F. 23 The recursive impact factor Ri of journal i is computed as the ixed point of the following system of equations
where J denotes the set of journals, Cij counts the number of citations in journal j to journal i, Pi is the number of all papers/articles in journal i. It is an impact factor where every citation has the weight of the recursive impact factor of the citing journal. All Ri are normalized such that the average paper has an Ri of one. For the discounted recursive impact factor, each citation is further weighted by 1/T , where T is the age of the citation in years. 24 A detailed description of these variables can be found in Appendix B. 
Empirical Production Function
Following Equation (1), the empirical production function of paper s ∈ P is given by
where ϵ s denotes a paper-speciic random shock. We specify α i = exp(x ⊤ i β), where x i is a k × 1 vector of author-speciic exogenous characteristics, to ensure that author's ability is always presented by a positive value. To estimate this empirical production function, we can consider either the nonlinear least squares method or the likelihood approach (under the distribution assumption of ϵ s ), with the unobervable e is computed by the equilibrium research efort given in Equation (5). However, as the equilibrium research efort portfolio depends on the diagonal matrix G, with its diagonal element g is ∈ {0, 1} indicating whether agent i participates in project s, estimating the empirical production function of Equation (13) may sufer from a selfselection bias due to the endogeneity of G. Think of the possibility that high-ability authors may choose high-potential papers to work on. From working on high-potential papers, they also have a better chance to meet other high ability coauthors. As a result, estimating the spillover efect, λ, from Equation (13) without handling endogeneity of the coauthor network G would sufer from a self-selection bias.
Matching Process and Identiication Strategy
To resolve this self-selection bias, we adopt Heckman's selection-correction approach, or more generally the so-called control function approach [Wooldridge, 2015] , in which a selection equation is introduced to model the correlations of error terms between the main output equation and the selection equation. More formally, to address the problem of self-selectivity, we model the endogenous matching process of author i ∈ N to paper s ∈ P with
where 1(·) is an indicator function, ψ is captures the matching quality between author i and paper s, and u is is a dyad-speciic random component [cf. Chandrasekhar and Jackson, 2012; Friel et al., 2016] . In particular, we assume
where z is is a h × 1 vector of dyad-speciic exogenous variables with its coeicients γ 1 capturing the similarity between author i and the paper s. We irst measure similarity by the research overlap in the NEP ields of paper s and author i. In particular, to avoid the possibility of authors changing ields (and the potential endogeneity concerns that would arise through that), we use the NEP ield announced for each author's irst paper available in the RePEc database.
In our empirical analysis, we also include additional variables in z is to capture the average similarity of each author i and the other authors collaborating in project s based on gender, ethnicity, ailiation, whether they have an advisor-advisee relationship [cf. Colussi, 2017] , and whether they have coauthored or shared common coauthors in the past. 25 One can interpret the average similarities towards the coauthors' characteristics in the same project as additional way to measure the similarity between the author and the project. For example, if the majority of authors in a project are ailiated to the same department, then this project can be regarded as speciic to this department and an author is likely to join this project if she is also ailiated with this department. More generally speaking, our speciication tries to relect the high assortativity in the matching process in scientiic coauthorship networks documented in Ductor [2014] . However, note that diferently from Ductor [2014] , our matching equation allows us to control not only for author but also for paper/project speciic efects. The variable µ i accounts for all author i's time-invariant unobservable attributes, including curiosity, patience, devotion, and others. The variable κ s similarly represents a paper s's unobservable characteristics. Including µ i and κ s allows us to capture the heterogeneity of authors across papers [cf. Graham, 2015 Graham, , 2017 . Assuming u is is i.i.d. type-I extreme value distributed, we then obtain a logistic regression model for the matching process.
The key feature of the above endogenous matching Equation (14) is to introduce authorand paper-speciic latent variables, µ = (µ 1 , . . . , µ n ) and κ = (κ 1 , . . . , κ p ), so that we can also control these latent factors in the determination of paper output. In other words, we extend the production function of Equation (13) to
where v s is assumed to be independent of u is in Equation (14) and other terms in Equation (16) and normally distributed with zero mean and variance σ 2 v . The identiication of the spillover parameter λ in the production function of Equation (16) then comes from the exogenous variation of the research overlap between author i and the potential project s [as in Ductor, 2014] . The research overlap is relevant for the endogenous matching of authors and papers in Equation (14), but is naturally excluded from the production function of Equation (16).
from which we can estimate the parameter vector
Observe that the author-and project-speciic efects, µ i and κ s , both appear in the outcome Equation (16) and the matching Equation (15). Thus, omitting them will cause correlations between the error terms of the two equations and hence a self-selection bias emerges.
However, by explicitly considering both of them through the joint likelihood of Equation (17), this bias can be corrected for.
Bayesian Estimation
Since the probability function in Equation (17) involves a high-dimensional integration of latent variables, it is not easy to apply a traditional maximum likelihood method even when resorting to a simulation approach. As an alternative estimation method, the Bayesian Markov Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) approach can be more eicient for estimating latent variable models [cf. Zeger and Karim, 1991] . We divide the parameter vector θ and other unknown latent variables into blocks and assign the prior distributions as follows:
We consider the normal and inverse gamma (IG) conjugate priors, which are widely used in the Bayesian literature [Koop et al., 2007] . The hyper parameters are chosen to make the prior distribution relatively lat and cover a wide range of the parameter space, i.e., we set VIII. Draw σ 2 v using the conjugate inverse gamma conditional posterior distribution.
We collect the draws from iterating the above steps and compute the posterior mean and the posterior standard deviation as our estimation results. In Appendix D we show that the above Bayesian MCMC estimation approach can efectively recover the true parameters from the model of Equations (15) and (16), respectively, in a Monte Carlo experiment. Table 2 reports the estimation results from left to right, considering separately the cases of homogeneous and heterogeneous spillovers (cf. Section 2.1) as well as the case where, in the utility of an author, we discount the payof by the number of coauthors in each project (cf. Section 2.2). In each case, the irst column (Exo. Net.) shows the results where we have assumed that the collaboration network is exogenously given (i.e., ζ and η in Equation (16) are restricted to be zeros), and the estimation procedure is solely based on the production function outlined in Section 4.2. The second column (Endo. Net.) allows the collaboration network to be formed endogenously and is based on the joint estimation of the production function and the matching process described in Section 4.3.
Estimation Results
In case of an assumed exogenous network, we ind that the spillover efect between coauthors, measured by λ, does not have the expected positive sign. In addition, the congestion (cost) efect across the projects of an author, measured by ϕ, is signiicant but small in magnitude. In contrast, in the endogenous network case, the estimate of λ is signiicant and positive (as expected), and the estimate of ϕ is much larger in magnitude. Thus, we can conclude that the estimates of λ and ϕ are downward biased when the endogenous matching between authors and projects is not controlled for. To show why biases are downward, we provide a heuristic explanation in Appendix C by using the estimates from the exogenous and the endogenous network cases to simulate author abilities, eforts, and project outputs. We show that in the exogenous network case author abilities and eforts are overpredicted due to the omission of author-and project-speciic efects. This leads to a lower spillover parameter estimate to match (14). We implement MCMC sampling for 30,000 iterations and leave the irst 1000 draws for burn-in and use the rest of draws for computing the posterior mean (as the point estimate) and the posterior standard deviation (put into the parenthesis). The asterisks ***(**,*) indicate that the 99% (95%, 90%) highest posterior density range does not cover zero.
the observed project output levels. In addition, we conduct a Monte Carlo simulation study to investigate the performance of our estimation method. As shown by the simulation results in Appendix D, we ind the same downward biases appear in the estimates of λ and ϕ when the collaboration network is incorrectly assumed to be exogenously given.
Regarding the efect of author characteristics on project output, we ind that the number of lifetime citations is a positive and signiicant predictor of research output [cf. e.g., Ductor, 2014] , while experience (measured by decades after receiving a Ph.D.) is signiicantly negative. 26
This inding mirrors Ductor [2014] , who shows that career time has a negative impact on productivity and it is consistent with the academics' life-cycle efects documented in Levin and
Stephan [1991] . The male dummy shows a positive efect on research output when controlling for network endogeneity [cf. Ductor et al., 2017; Krapf et al., 2017] . Authors might difer in their competencies and knowledge bases. These diferences can afect the spillovers and complementarities authors generate when collaborating on a joint project. In order to capture these heterogeneities, we construct the Jafe proximity measures of research ields (NEP) between each pair of authors. 28, 29 We then incorporate this proximity measure into the production function of Equation (1). In the case of heterogeneous spillovers in Table 2 , we again ind that when omitting the endogenous matching of authors and papers, the estimate of λ and ϕ are downward biased. However, after controlling for endogenous matching, the estimates of λ and ϕ become signiicant with the expected signs. Also note that the estimate of λ doubles compared to the homogeneous spillovers case. This is due to the fact that the Jafe proximity weights are smaller than one and thus a larger spillover coeicient is obtained in compensation.
Similar estimation results can be obtained for the case where we discount the payof by the number of coauthors in each project in the utility of an author in Equation (2), 30 indicating 26 Following Rauber and Ursprung [2008] we have also estimated a polynomial of order ive in decades after Ph.D. graduation. The result shows that the coeicient of the irst order is signiicantly negative, while the remaining higher orders are insigniicant. 27 In particular, Krapf et al. [2017] ind that the efect of parenthood on research productivity is negative for women.
28 Jafe [1986] introduces this measure for the analysis of technological proximity between patents. More recently, Bloom et al. [2013] illustrates how Jafe similarity afects irms' proits with diferent patent portfolios.
29 From the authors' NEP ields, we computed their research ield proximity following Jafe [1986] as
where Pi represents the NEP ields of author i and is a vector whose k-th component P ik counts the number of papers author i has in NEP ield k divided by the total number of papers of that author with an attributed ield. 30 However, Kuld and O'Hagan [2018] argue that the available empirical evidence suggests that there is very the robustness of our results to alternative speciications. Nevertheless, it is still worth pointing out that in the case of discounting utilities, the estimated spillover efect takes a larger value in order to sustain the incentives for authors to collaborate. There are further robustness checks to be found in Section 4.6 below.
For the matching between authors and projects, we indeed ind that similarities in the research (NEP) ields positively and signiicantly afect matchings [Ductor, 2014] . In terms of assortative matching between coauthors, having the same ethnicity, same gender, same ailiation, being past co-authors, and sharing common co-authors all make matching more likely [cf. Freeman and Huang, 2015] . Being in a Ph.D. advisor-advisee relationship also largely contributes to matchings. Further, an author's latent variable shows a signiicant positive efect on the author-project matching. The project latent variable has a negative efect on the matching, indicating that high-quality projects are more scarce and thus more diicult to join. These results hold across all speciications.
Finally, in Appendix E we examine the goodness-of-it of the estimated matching model with respect to various network statistics in the data. We ind that across the statistics considered, the estimated model is consistent with the observed network.
Robustness Analyses
We perform a number of robustness checks in Appendix F to gauge the sensitivity of the estimates shown in Table 2 . First, in Table F .1 we show the estimation results using only the similarities in the research (NEP) ields for the matching score of Equation (15). The estimated spillover and congestion efects are similar to the ones reported in Table 2 , reassuring that identiication comes from the exogenous variation in the research overlap between author and projects.
Secondly, the irst two columns in Table F .4 show the estimation results with an alternative paper output measure. While in Table 2 we used the sum of citation recursive impact factors to measure a paper's output, in Table F .4 we simply use the sum of the citation impact factors as an alternative. We ind that the estimation results are similar to the ones obtained in Table   2 . Then, the next four columns of Table F Table 2 , the estimates of λ and ϕ in the exogenous network case in Table F.4 are downward biased due to omitting the endogenous matching between authors and projects and the biases can be corrected when we jointly model formation of the paper output and the coauthor network. Except the pattern of bias correction, the results further show that the spillover and congestion efects increase over time across sample periods, implying the increasing importance of coauthorship network on economic research.
limited discounting of a published article by the number of co-authors.
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Rankings for Individuals and Departments
With our estimates from the previous section we are now able to perform various counterfactual studies. In this section we investigate the reduction in total output upon the removal of individual authors or entire research institutions from the network (cf. Section 3.1). Note that when an individual author or an institute is removed, the collaboration network will be rewired after this intervention according to the matching process described in Section 4.3. We use the estimates in Table 2 for the homogeneous spillovers case with endogenous matching for our analysis. The algorithm for network rewiring follows the network simulation method used in the goodness-of-it examination in Appendix E.
The ranking of individual authors and institutions can be found in Tables 3 and 4 , respectively. The key author from our simulation is Robert Barro from Harvard University. Our results suggest that, without this author, total output would be 2.28% lower (cf. Column 9
in Table 3 ). The second and third highest ranked authors are Ariel Rubinstein from Tel Aviv University and Carmen Reinhart from Harvard University. Their impacts on research output are 1.83% and 1.51%, respectively. In line with the individual ranking, we ind that the Department of Economics and the Kennedy School of Government of Harvard University occupy the top two institutions in Table 4 .
We ind that highly ranked authors tend to have a higher breadth of citing papers across NEP ields (Column 7 in Table 3 ). Working on a wider range of topics may facilitate the generation of new ideas and start new research projects. A more diverse knowledge base might also help in communicating and collaborating with a broader range of people, and thus allow these authors to occupy more central network positions. Our indings are consistent with Ductor [2014] who shows that a lower degree of specialization has a positive impact on academic productivity.
These highly productive authors provide crucial inputs to research projects and cannot easily be substituted in the matching process with their coauthors in the network. Thus, their removal from the network has a strong efect on the total output generated.
Further, from a correlation analysis of the ranking of authors we observe that highly ranked authors tend to have a larger number of projects (Column 2), a larger number of citations (Column 3), and a higher RePEc rank (Column 4). In contrast, purely network-based measures like closeness centrality (Column 5) or betweenness centrality (Column 6) are only weakly correlated with the ranking. 31 The above indicators do not yield the same ranking that we obtain based on our model and the data, as they either are derived from citation counts or depend on the network position only, while our ranking integrates both. Moreover, other rankings are typically not derived from microeconomic foundations and do not take into account spillover efects generated in scientiic knowledge production networks.
31 See the notes in Table 3 for a deinition of these measures. b Betweenness centrality measures the fraction of all shortest paths in the network that contain a given node. Nodes with a high betweenness centrality have the potential to disconnect a network if they are removed. In contrast, closeness centrality is a measure of centrality in a network that is calculated as the sum of the length of the shortest paths between the node and all other nodes in the graph. The higher the closeness centrality of a node is, the closer it is to all other nodes in the network. See Wasserman and Faust [1994] and Jackson [2008] for a more detailed discussion of these centrality measures. c NEP cites measures the breadth of citations across NEP ields. Citation breadth is measured by the number k of NEP ields in which at least one paper citing the author has been announced. Ties are broken by computing the number of ields in which x such papers have been announced, where x = mod (k/10 + 2) (score listed after decimal point). d The output loss for researcher i is computed as ∑ p s=1 Ys(G) − ∑ p s=1 Ys(G\i) with the parameter estimates from Table 2 . See also Equation (3.1) in Section 6. 
with the parameter estimates from Table 2 . See also Equation (7) in Section 6.
Research Funding for Individuals and Departments
The presence of spillovers in the coauthorship network generates externalities that are not internalized in the utility function of the agents. As a consequence, individual efort levels might not be optimal from a planner's perspective who wants to maximize total research output. In order to create additional incentives for the authors, in this section we analyze a funding scheme that rewards an author in proportion to the output she generates (see Section 3.2) .
Assuming that research funds (per unit of output) are homogeneous across projects but heterogeneous across authors, we compute the optimal network-based funding scheme, (r * i ) 1≤i≤n , by solving Equation (11) with the parameter estimates from Section 4.5. 32 The average optimal funding level per unit of output is 0.0977 with a standard deviation of 0.0732. We ind that the optimal research funding policy can raise total net output by 4.2%.
We next compare our optimal funding scheme with funding programs being implemented in the real world [cf. e.g., De Frajay, 2016; Stephan, 2012] . For this purpose we use data on the funding amount, the receiving economics department, and the principal investigators from We use the estimates for the homogeneous spillovers case with endogenous matching in Table 2 . Moreover, we initialize the optimization algorithm with the solution from a homogeneous (across authors and projects) funding policy, given by r * = 0.0414. The latter would yield a net output gain of 0.16%. 33 See https://www.nsf.gov/awardsearch/. 34 The data coverage before 1976 is incomplete, and we thus discarded years prior to 1976. 35 The NBER is ranked fourth according to our network-based optimal funding scheme. See also Table 6 . total of 57 million U.S. dollars. The average funding across organizations from the NSF is 2.8 million U.S. dollars. A Lorenz curve illustrating the high inequality of the NSF awards can be seen in the left panel in Figure 6 .
The right panel in Figure 6 shows a Lorenz curve of our optimal funding policy. The igure illustrates that the optimal funding policy is highly skewed and tends to concentrate funds towards the most productive authors. The concentration of funds towards the most productive researchers is even higher than for the NSF awards, with a Gini coeicient of g = 0.59 for the NSF awards and a coeicient of g = 0.93 for our network-based optimal funding policy. The concentration of funds towards the most productive researchers relects the fact that most of the scientiic output is produced by only a small fraction of the most productive economists [Conley and Onder, 2014] . Table 5 shows the optimal network-based research funding amount per author together with the awards these authors actually received from the NSF relative to the total awards provided by the NSF. We observe that the highest ranked/funded authors tend to have a larger number of projects and degree/number of coauthors (Columns 2 and 3 in Table 5 ; see also 7) , illustrating the importance of the coauthorship network for the optimal funding policy. Moreover, the optimal funding amount is negatively correlated with closeness centrality and the RePEc rank and positively correlated with the number of citations and betweenness centrality (Columns 4-7 in Table 5 ). 36, 37 As nodes with a high betweenness centrality tend to disconnect a network when they are removed [cf. e.g., Wasserman and Faust, 1994] , the latter indicates that authors bridging diferent parts of the network should be allocated larger amounts of research funds.
36 See also Footnote b in Table 3 for a deinition and explanation of the closeness and betweenness centrality measures.
37 Unlike the ranking of authors in Table 5 , the optimal funding scheme turns out to be uncorrelated with the breadth of citations across NEP ields as measured by NEP cites. We only report the 236 researchers that are listed as principal investigators in the economics program of the National Science Foundation (NSF) in the U.S. from 1976 to 2016 and that can be identiied in the RePEc database. The optimal funding policy, however, is computed with data from the full sample. b The RePEc ranking is based on an aggregate of rankings by diferent criteria. See Zimmermann [2013] for more information. c See also Footnote c in Table 3 . d NEP cites measures the breadth of citations across NEP ields. See also Footnote d in Table 3 . e The total cost of funds, ∑ p s=1 r * is gisδsYs(G, R * ), of researcher i with the optimal research funding scheme R * = (r * is ) of Equation (11) in Section 3.2 with the parameter estimates from Table 2 (for the homogeneous spillovers case with endogenous matching). Figure 7 : Pair correlation plot of the authors' degrees, citations, total NSF awards, and the optimal funding policy. The Spearman correlation coeicients are shown for each scatter plot, with signiicant coeicients indicated in bold. The data have been log, respectively, square root transformed to account for the heterogeneity across observations.
Further, we ind that the rankings resulted from our optimal funding policy and the rankings chosen by the NSF difer. 38 The author with the highest funds according to our network-based policy is Tim Bollerslev from Duke University (with 7.62% of the total funds), followed by Sendhil Mullainathan from Harvard University (with 4.02% of the total funds) and Guido Imbens from Stanford University (with 3.13% of the total funds). The third-ranked author received almost twice as much funding from the NSF as the second-ranked author. The diference between the optimal network-based funding policy and the one implemented by the NSF is, however, not surprising, as current research funding instruments typically do not take into account the spillover efects generated in scientiic knowledge production networks. 39
The diferences between the NSF funding and our funding policy becomes also evident from a simple correlation analysis. Figure 7 shows the correlations of the authors' degrees, lifetime citations, total NSF awards and our network-based optimal funding policy. We observe that the optimal funding policy is signiicantly positively correlated with the number of citations and the degree (number of coauthors). We also found a positive and signiicant correlation (0.3) of the key player ranking of Table 3 with the optimal funding policy in Table 5 . In contrast, the NSF awards are positively but not signiicantly correlated with the degree or the optimal 38 The comparison is based on the 236 authors that could be identiied in both the RePEc and the NSF awards databases. The optimal funding policy, however, is computed with data from the full sample.
39 There are also other systematic diferences between our funding policy and the NSF that are worth mentioning. First, the NSF ranking is based on the whole historical record, while our optimal funding ranking is only based on authors' performances between 2010-2012. Second, the NSF funding is application based, while our optimal funding policy is merit (i.e. publication output) based. 
, for each department D and researchers i ∈ D with the optimal research funding scheme R * = (r * is ) of Equation (11) funding policy. 40 This highlights the importance of the collaboration network in determining the optimal funding policy, while it does not seem to have an efect on the allocation of NSF awards.
A similar ranking as in Table 5 , but at the departmental level, can be found in Table 6 . We ind that Harvard University receives the largest amount of funds (12.86% of the total), followed by Duke University (7.70% of the total funds). Similar to the ranking of individual authors in Table 5 , we observe that the actual funding provided by the NSF does not coincide with the optimal funding policy that we obtain (for example, the ifth-ranked university received twice as much funds from the NSF as the second-ranked one), which explicitly considers spillover efects between the authors within and across diferent departments.
Conclusion
In this paper, we have analyzed the equilibrium eforts of authors who seek to maximize the quality of their scientiic output when involved in multiple, possibly overlapping projects with coauthors. We show that, given an allocation of researchers to diferent projects, the Nash equilibrium can be completely characterized. We then bring our model to the data by analyzing the network of coauthorship between economists registered in the RePEc Author Service. We rank the authors and their departments according to their contribution to aggregate research output, and thus provide a novel ranking measure that is based on microeconomic foundations by determining the key players in the network.
Moreover, we analyze various funding instruments for individual researchers as well as their departments. We show that, because current research funding schemes do not take into account 40 However, the NSF funding is positively and signiicantly correlated with the number of citations of an author. the availability of coauthorship network data, they are ill-designed to take advantage of the spillover efects generated in scientiic knowledge production networks. Indeed, the optimal funding policy outcomes deviate substantially from the empirical outcome because we internalize the coauthorship (network) externality. Further, they deviate from the key player rankings because of the diferent objectives of these two counterfactual studies. While the key player ranking identiies the authors that are already highly productive and exert large spillover efects on their coauthors, the optimal funding policy identiies the authors who can become key players by providing them with additional incentives through a merit based funding scheme.
In this section we provide an explanation why in Table 2 the estimates of λ and ϕ in the case of the exogenous network of Model (1) are biased downward compared with the results in the case of the endogenous network of Model (2) . A formal derivation of these estimation biases would be diicult due to the nonlinearity of equilibrium research eforts in Equation (5) used during estimation. As an alternative, we use a counterfactual simulation to study the direction of the bias.
To begin our investigation, irst note that the diference between Model (1) and the output equation of Model (2) lies in the presence of author-and project-speciic efects in Model (2) . In Model (1), where the coauthorship network is regarded as exogenous, we cannot control authorand project-speciic efects in the output equation because, for each project and each author who only participated in one project, they only appear once in the sample, and thus we do not have enough variation to identify author-and project-speciic efects. On the contrary, Model (2) exploits not only variations across project outputs but also the endogenous matching between authors and projects. The multiple matching outcomes for each author and each project provide suicient sample variations to identify author-and project-speciic efects in Model (2) . That is to say, the potential bias problem in the coeicient estimates in Model (1) could be attributed to the omission of author-and project-speciic efects.
We irst look at the distributions of author ability (α), research efort (e), and estimated project output based on the estimates of Model (1) and the estimates of Model (2), respectively.
The distributions of estimated author abilities in the 2010-2012 sample from Model (1) and
Model (2) are shown in Figure C .1. One can see that the estimated author abilities from Model (2) are generally lower than those from Model (1), indicating that ignoring author-speciic efects (µ) results in an upward bias on the estimated author abilities in Model (1). Next, we show the distributions of research eforts from Model (1) and Model (2) in Figure C showing that Model (1) generates upward biases on the estimates of research efort. Finally, we plot the distributions of predicted project output in Figure C. 3. From the igure, it is clear that Model (1) (blue line) its the real data (green line) much worse than Model (2) (red line).
Therefore, ignoring author-and project-speciic efects makes Model (1) less suitable for the paper output data.
Next, we should answer why the estimates of λ and ϕ are biased downward in Model (1).
Our argument is, because Model (1) overestimates author ability and research efort as shown in Figures C.1 and C.2, a smaller (or even negative) collaborative spillover parameter is estimated to it the level of project outputs observed in the data. Implicatively, a higher collaborative spillover parameter in Model (1) could potentially lead to an over-prediction of project outputs.
To support this argument we re-estimate Model (1) with restrictions as in the following three counterfactual scenarios: (i) ixing λ at the value from Model (2) (ii) ixing ϕ at the value from Model (2); (iii) ixing both λ and ϕ at the values from Model (2) in Table 2 . Then we use these counterfactual estimation results to predict project outputs, which are shown in Figure   C .4. From the igure we observe that none of these restricted models provides a better it to the data than the original unrestricted Model (1); and thus, none of them would achieve a higher likelihood value compared with the original Model (1) without ixing any parameter value. This shows that higher values of λ and ϕ would not be supported from estimation of Model (1).
Thus, compared with Model (2), which incorporates author-and project-speciic efects to solve the potential omitted variables problem, the estimation results of λ and ϕ in Model (1) (1) with an assumed exogenous coauthorship network and Model (2) with endogenous author-project matching. (1) with an assumed exogenous coauthorship network; from Model (2) with endogenous author-project matching; and from the data. downward biased.
D. Performance of the Bayesian MCMC Estimation Approach
To show that the Bayesian MCMC estimation approach in Section 4.4 can efectively recover the true parameters from the model of Equations (15) and (16), we conduct a Monte Carlo simulation to study the bias and standard deviation from the estimation results. The simulation consists of 100 repetitions. In each repetition, the data-generating process (DGP) runs as follows: we irst simulate dyadic binary exogenous variables z is ∈ {0, 1} by drawing two uniform random variables, u i and u s . If both u i and u s are above 0.7 or below 0.3, we set z is = 1;
otherwise, we set z is = 0. We simulate individual exogenous variables x, author latent variables µ, and project latent variables κ from standard normal distributions. Then, we generate the artiicial project participation G and project output Y based on the matching function of Equation (15) and the production function of Equation (16) . After obtaining the artiicial data, we estimate two models: one is the true model of DGP where both project output and project participation are endogenous and the other is just the production function by treating the participation matrix G as exogenous. We conduct simulations with two sample sizes to show how data information can improve estimation accuracy in inite samples.
The simulation results are summarized in Table D .1. We report the bias and the standard 
E. Goodness-of-Fit Statistics
The matching model outlined in Section 4.3 attempts to uncover a channel in which authors choose projects in which to participate. Based upon participation, authors form coauthorship links with others. A way to tell whether this matching model explains the real data well or not is to conduct a goodness-of-it examination for the implied coauthor network.
We follow Hunter et al. [2008] to conduct the goodness-of-it examination. We take the observed coauthor network data from the real sample. Then we simulate one hundred artiicial networks from our matching model with parameters reported in Table 2 . Model itness is examined by the similarity between simulated networks and observed networks in the distribution of four network statistics -degree, edge-wise shared partner, minimum geodesic distance, and average nearest neighbor connectivity.
In order to simulate artiicial coauthorship networks, we follow the iteration approach of Snijders [2002] . In this approach, the simulated bipartite collaboration network G at diferent iterations t, G (1) , G (2) , . . . , G (t) , form a Markov chain and the transition probability of the Markov chain is given by
for G a , G b ∈ G(n, p), where G(n, p) denotes the set of all bipartite collaboration network matrices G with the same number n of authors and p projects. Following Equation (17) of Snijders [2002] , we simulate G from the transition probability by the Meteropolis-Hastings (M-H) algorithm: at each iteration, we randomly choose an element δ is from G (t) and change it from δ
is . This change will be accepted by probability
with function ψ is given in Equation (15) and its estimation result in Table 2 . This M-H sampling procedure satisies the detailed balance condition so that after convergence we can regard the realized G from the last iteration as the one drawn from its stationary distribution. In practice, we set the number of iterations to 2np, where n is the number of authors and p is the number of projects. After getting the simulated participation incidence matrix G, we do a projection (cf. Figure 1 ) to obtain the coauthor network adjacency matrix.
The examination results are shown in Figure F .1. We present the distributions of statistics for the observed network by solid lines and the distributions for the simulated networks by dotted lines (mean with 5 th and 95 th percentiles). As network statistics we consider the degree distribution, edge-wise shared partners, average nearest neighbor degree and the clustering degree distribution. 43 From the igure we ind that the simulated networks and the observed network display similar distributions over these four statistics. This suggests that our estimated model is able to emulate the unobserved network-generating process.
F. Additional Robustness Checks
In this appendix we report the various results of our robustness checks to analyze the sensitivity of the estimates shown in Table 2 . First, in Table F .1 we show the estimation results using only the similarities in the research (NEP) ields for the matching score of Equation (15) . The estimated spillover and congestion efects are similar to the ones reported in Table 2 , reassuring that identiication comes from the exogenous variation in the research overlap between author and projects. Secondly, Table F .4 shows the estimation results with an alternative paper output measure. While in Table 2 we used the sum of citation recursive impact factors to measure a papers' output, in the irst two columns of Table F .4 we simply use the sum of the citation impact factor as an alternative. Then, the next four columns of Table F The edge-wise shared partners contain information of a network related to the count of triangles in a network G. Its distribution consists of values EPG(0)/EG, · · · , EPG(m − 2)/EG, where EPG(k) denotes the number of edges whose endpoints both share edges with exactly k other nodes and EG is the total number of edges in network G. The average nearest neighbor connectivity is the average degree of the neighbors of a node. The clustering coeicient measures the fraction of connected neighbors of a node with degree k. Tables 1, F.2 and F.3, it is clear that the paper output measure declines when the sample period approaches closer to the end date, which is due to a shorter time for papers to accumulate their citations. We also see the average number of co-authors in each paper increases gradually over time from 1.576 (in years 2007-2009) to 1.661 (in years 2013-2015) . From the author side, most author attributes remain similar over time, despite that authors in the earlier sample have more lifetime citations and longer years of experiences.
Estimation results are presented in Table 2 for the exogenous network (Exo. Net.) and the endogenous network (Endo. Net.) cases. Similar to the results of Table 2 in the main text, the estimates of λ and ϕ in the exogenous network case are downward biased due to omitting the endogenous matching between authors and projects; and the biases can be corrected when we jointly model paper output and the formation of the coauthor network. Except for the same pattern of bias correction, the results further show that the spillover and congestion efects rise over time across sample periods, implying the increasing importance of the coauthor network on economic research. Notes: The dependent variables are project output following Equation (16) and project-author matching following Equation (14) using only the similarities in the research (NEP) ields for the matching score function. Model (1) assumes homogeneous spillovers between coauthors. Model (2) allows for heterogeneous spillovers using Jafe's similarity measure for the research ields of collaborating authors. Model (3) considers the case where in the utility of an author in Equation (2) we discount the number of coauthors in each project. We implement MCMC sampling for 30,000 iterations and leave the irst 1000 draws for burn-in and use the rest of draws for computing the posterior mean (as the point estimate) and the posterior standard deviation (put into the parenthesis). The asterisks ***(**,*) indicate that the 99% (95%, 90%) highest posterior density range does not cover zero. (2) (1) (2) (1) 
